On Epistemic Alchemy: Entitlemen­t, Justificat­ion, and Closure

Where: Arché Scepticism Conference, University of St Andrews, Basic Knowledge Project Dates: 13th June 2009 - 14th June 2009 When: 13th June 2009, 2pm - 4pm

Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept various propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one is not in a position to rationally claim warrant for most of one’s beliefs. Here I will argue that Wright has underestimated a problem for his proposal, which I’ll call the alchemy problem. ‘Epistemic alchemy’ is Martin Davies term for the conversion of entitlement to accept a proposition into justification to believe it, and the problem for Wright is that his picture seems to allow alchemical conversion to take place. Wright considers a version of this problem, but the version he confronts invokes a closure principle for justification, and his response is to deny that principle. I offer two arguments designed to question the adequacy of this response. Lastly, I explore the idea that epistemic alchemy is not objectionable after all. I argue that the proponent of Wright’s picture who wants to pursue this option faces the difficult task of showing how the alchemy problem differs from Stewart Cohen’s superficially similar ‘problem of easy knowledge’.

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